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My assignment was to comment on Professor Crump's article' from a
conservative perspective, to complement the response to his article from
Dean Dennis Shields,2 who had been instrumental in administering the
University of Michigan School of Law's affirmative action policies
approved in Grutter v. Bollinger.' Professor Crump suggests that the
conservative position on the issue of affirmative action in university
admissions is to argue for a "color-blind" admissions policy, ignoring any
distinctions of race or ethnic origin." It is true that at least some
conservatives have made this argument,' and I have made it on another
occasion myself,6 but advocacy of a "color-blind" Constitution, much in
the manner of the first Justice Harlan," is not all there is to a conservative
constitutional jurisprudence, and it may be that there are elements of
conservative thought that support, rather than undermine, affirmative
action. Nevertheless, what most conservatives believe is inconsistent with
what Justice O'Connor and her colleagues did in Grutter,and inconsistent
* Raoul Berger Professor of Legal History, Northwestern University School ofLaw; Legalaffairs Editor, CHRONICLES: A MAGAZINE OF AMERICAN CULTURE.
1. David Crump, The Narrow Tailoring Issue in the Affirmative Action Cases:
Reconsideringthe Supreme Court'sApproval in Gratz andGrutter ofRace-BasedDecision-Making
by IndividualizedDiscretion,56 FLA. L. REV. 483 (2004).
2. Dennis J. Shields, A Response to Crump's Narrow TailoringAnalysis of Grutter: Does
it Matter How Many Angels Can Dance on the Head of a Pin?, 56 FLA. L. REV. 761 (2004).
3. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
4. Crump, supra note 1, at 506.
5. Professor Crump cites John Leo for this proposition. Crump, supranote 1, at 505 n.130
(citing John Leo, The Supremes'Sophistry,U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 14, 2003, at 7).
6. STEPHEN B. PRESSER, RECAPTURING THE CONsTmrIoN: RACE, REuGION, AND
ABORTION RECONSIDERED 210-14, 219-25, 284 (1994) (advocating a color-blind Constitution).
7. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Our constitution
is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.").
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as well with what Professor Crump proposes as an alternative to Grutter's
approach. Accordingly, in this Commentary I will first set out what I
believe to be the principal tenets of modem American conservatism and
then suggest how they apply in the context of constitutional law. I will
proceed to criticize the opinions in Grutter' and Gratz9 in light of this
particular version of conservative jurisprudence, and then subject
Professor Crump's proposal to the same conservative scrutiny.
I. WHAT DO AMERICAN CONSERVATIVES BELIEVE?

There is some confusion over the core beliefs (if there are any) held by
American conservatives. If one reads the English and American popular
press, one can find references to "neo-conservatives,""
"paleoconservatives,"" "libertarians,"' 2 and "Straussians,"' 3 just to

8. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
9. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
10. See, e.g., Alec Russell, Fighting Talk from Prince of "Neo-cons" Alec Russell in
Washington Meets RichardPerle,One of the IntellectualDrivingForcesBehind the Iraq Conflict,
Who Will Also Be in London, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 17, 2003, at 12 ("The closest
equivalent of neo-conservatives would be classical liberals: people who believe the blessings of
freedom should be made widely available.").
11. See, e.g., William A. Rusher, Conservatism101: A Checklist, CHATANOOGATIMES FREE
PRESS, June 16, 2003, at B7.
In or about 1986 (there is some dispute over the exact year), a group of
conservatives who disliked the interventionist foreign policies and alleged
indifference to big government that was being displayed by the neoconservatives,
ferociously denounced them, loudly abandoned the conservative movement
altogether, and called themselves "paleoconservatives." Most of their names are
not nationally familiar, but Pat Buchanan belongs in (or somewhere near) this
group, since he favors America First isolationism and trade protectionism (tariffs).
Id.
12. See, e.g., id.
From the start, the conservatives recognized the existence of a group of

country cousins who called themselves "libertarians." The libertarians had been
around for a while. Their big obsession was government, which they wanted to
keep as small as possible. The conservatives had considerable sympathy for this
view, but thought there was more to conservatism than just that. Moreover, the
libertarians' antagonism to government action kept them from endorsing
wholeheartedly government measures needed to win the Cold War.
Id.

13. Paul Starobin, The French Were Right, 35 NAT'L J.1, Nov. 8, 2003 ("Straussians tend
to believe in the ability of intellectual elites-modem-day philosopher-kings--to discern truths
unavailable to lesser minds. 'It's a European style of getting the peasants to do what "we" say,' said
James Pinkerton, a critic of the Iraq intervention who worked in the Bush I White House.").
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mention a few groups thought to populate the Right of the American
political spectrum. All have different ideas about how our polity ought to
be run. The proliferation of these nuanced views probably owes something
to the general success of Republican politicians in the post-New Deal era,
as the centralized planning of socialist economies led to the collapse of the
Soviet Union, in particular, and communism in general, in Western
Europe. Still, there do seem to be a few general principles that define
American conservativism set forth in what ought to be regarded as the
bible of modern American conservative thought, the late Russell Kirk's
The Conservative Mind. From Burke to Eliot. 4
Slightly edited, these "six canons of conservative thought," as Kirk
called them, are:
1) Belief in a transcendent order, or body of natural law,
which rules society as well as conscience....
2) Affection for the proliferating variety and mystery of
human existence, as opposed to the narrowing uniformity,
egalitarianism, and utilitarian aims of most radical
systems ....
3) Conviction that civilized society requires orders and
classes, as against the notion of a "classless society."...
4) Persuasion that freedom and property are closely
linked ....
5) Faith in prescription and distrust of "sophisters,
calculators, and economists" who would reconstruct society
upon abstract designs....
6) Recognition that change may not be salutary reform:
hasty innovation may be a devouring conflagration, rather
than a torch of progress...
These six canons are at odds with the currently ascendant philosophy
in the academy, in general, and the law schools, in particular, which is
dominated by the insights of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and the "legal
realists." Most legal academics today probably believe that there are no
transcendent principles governing law or society; that the best one can do
at the macro level is to seek to implement democratic or utilitarian notions
that are generally regarded as "convenient" at a particular time and place,
while, at the micro level, leaving individuals free for themselves "to define
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life."' 6 Kirk's canons do, however, fairly characterize

14. RussELL KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE MIND: FROM BURKE TO ELOT (7th rev. ed. 1994).

15. Id. at8-9.
16. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality opinion) (commonly
referred to as the notorious "mystery passage"). This observation is, of course, a gross
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the beliefs of Edmund Burke, 7 the leading English classical liberal and
critic of the French Revolution, now regarded as the seminal modem
conservative thinker;'" William Blackstone, 9 whose Commentarieson the
Laws of England were profoundly influential on the development of
American law in the nineteenth century; and many of the American
founding generation, most notably George Washington, John Adams, and
Alexander Hamilton.20
Not everyone in the academy would agree with this assertion, but it
seems to me to be undeniable that the United States Constitution of 1789
and the Bill of Rights, which followed in 1791, were designed to make
permanent for American government many, if not most, of the principles
suggested by these "six canons." These principles include, for example:
deference to established precedents of the English common law and
"ancient constitution" based on natural law; the primacy of the protection
of private property, also thought to be guaranteed by that natural law; and,
in general, the freedom of the individual, protected in person and property
by the government, to engage in the spiritual and economic pursuits he
preferred, so long as those pursuits were consistent with a government
founded on the rule of law and what we now generally refer to as "JudeoChristian" moral and religious notions.2' Still, while the Constitution
appears to have been conceived in a manner that sought to recognize the
liberty, property, and dignity of individuals, its Framers also recognized
that in order for American society to function properly, there needed to be
a means to avoid some of the passions ofthe moment, to counter inevitable
tendencies toward corruption in humankind and all government, and to
elevate to 2positions
of power those individuals of superior knowledge and
2
character.

generalization, but for some further elaboration backing up this assertion please see, for example,
Stephen B. Presser, Some Thoughts on our Present Discontents and Duties: The Cardinal, Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., the Unborn, the Senate, and Us, I AVE MARIA L. REV. 113 (2003), and

PRESSER, supra note 6, at 49-58.
17. See generally EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (Frank M.

Turner ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1791) (providing perhaps the best introduction to Burke's
thought).
18. See, e.g., KIRK, supra note 14, at I (calling Burke "the greatest of modern conservative
thinkers").
19. See generally WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Univ.
of Chi. Press 1979) (1765-1769); see also DANIEL J.BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE
LAW (Univ. of Chi. Press 1996) (1941) (providing a modern classic interpretation of Blackstone).
20. For the argument that these Founders possessed a philosophy of government much like
that of Burke, see, for example, PRESSER, supra note 6, at 65-67.
21. Id.
22. See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-87
(1998 ed.) (1971).
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The familiar constitutional principles of separation of powers, checks
and balances, federalism, and the rule of law were means to the
achievement of the kind of society suggested by Kirk's sixcanons, and
they apparently were advocated by the most advanced works of "the
science of politics" available to the Framers, most notably Blackstone and
Montesquieu.23
From Montesquieu came the notion expressed by Hamilton in
Federalist 78, that "'there is no liberty if the power of judging be not
separated from the legislative and executive powers."' 24 Hamilton was
stressing the need for an independent judiciary with lifetime tenure and a
guaranteed salary, but Montesquieu's remark also indicates that the task
of judges is not to legislate, but simply to declare the law as it is, not as
they might desire it to be. In our time, profoundly influenced as we are by
Holmes and the legal realists' view that the task of judges is inherently
legislative,25 it is not easy in the academy to maintain such a view of the
judiciary. Nevertheless, the argument that judges should interpret and
reveal law and not make policy continues to be a staple of conservative
constitutional thought, most forcefully expressed in works such as Learned
Hand's The Bill of Rights. As Hand put it:
For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of
Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them,
which I assuredly do not. If they were in charge, I should
miss the stimulus of living in a society where I have, at least
26
theoretically, some part in the direction of public affairs.
This notion led Hand to suggest that when the Court is interpreting the
Constitution, its only proper role is to determine what the document was
understood to mean at the time it was written; it is not its job to depart
from that original understanding. Others, who probably could be
characterized as Burkean conservatives, went somewhat further than Hand
and concluded that it was appropriate for the Court to depart from the
original understanding of particular provisions, so long as the Justices
remained faithful to the values contained within those provisions, and so

23. On Blackstone and Montesquieu and their influence on American political thought at the
time of the Founding see, for example, PAUL 0. CARRESE, THE CLOAKING OF POWER:
MONTESQuIEu, BLACKST NE, AND THE RISE OF JUDICIAL ACTIVSM (2003).
24. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(quoting Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws).
25. For Holmes's elaboration ofthis notion see, for example, OLIVER WENDELLHOLMES, JR.,
THE COMMON LAW (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Belknap Press 1963) (1881). For the most radical
statement ofthe legal realists' embrace of Holmes's thought that the nature ofjudging is legislative,
see JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (Coward-McCann 1949) (1930).
26. LEARNED HAND, THE BILLOFRiGs 73 (1958).
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long as they were able to articulate "neutral principles," apart from a desire
for results in the particular case then before them, that could be applied, in
a general manner, to similar situations in the future.27
The folly of this conservative view was decried in the academy and
even from the bench.2" But, curiously, the conservatives' notion that
judges should not be engaged in the task of formulating social policy for
Americans continues to resonate with a significant part of our population.
The idea that judges should interpret and not legislate was a major theme
of George W. Bush's first presidential campaign, will likely be similarly
invoked in his second,29 and is still being bandied about in controversies
over judicial appointments in the United States Senate.30

27. For some representative works in this genre, see, for example, ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (Touchstone 1990) (1989),
ANTONIN SCALiA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COuRTs AND THE LAW (1997), and
Herbert Wechsler, TowardNeutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
28. See, e.g., J. Skelly Wright, ProfessorBickel, The Scholarly Tradition,andthe Supreme
Court, 84 HARv. L. REV. 769 (1971) (critiquing the thought of Wechsler, Alexander Bickel, and
others whom Judge Wright, then sitting on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, believed were advocating an impossible and wrong-headed constitutional
jurisprudence).
29. See, e.g., Nan Aron, JudicialDisappointments,INTHESE TIMES, Mar. 15, 2004, at 18.
Bush's reelection would provide the opportunity to appoint at least three Supreme
Court justices. Based on Bush's statements on justices he likes and the kind of
judges he has nominated, all indications show his nominees would be in the mold
of Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. A second Bush term would cement the
Republicans' hold on the federal judiciary for decades to come.
1d; see also Jonah Goldberg, It's Alive!, NAT'L REV., July 8, 2003, ("Justice Scalia has summed
up the Right's basic position succinctly. 'The Constitution is not an organism. It is a legal
document.' Equally succinct, George W. Bush explained during the 2000 campaign that he likes
judges like Scalia and Clarence Thomas."); What is the Law?, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS,
Mar. 15, 2004, at B7 ("President George W. Bush wantsjudges who don't make law but apply what
has already been written by the Founders and by the people's elected representatives.").
30. See, e.g., Stephen B. Presser, Should Ideology of Judicial Nominees Matter?: Is the
Senate's Current Reconsideration of the Confirmation ProcessJustified?, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL.
245 (200 1). For a somewhat lighter-hearted consideration of the current dispute over the selection
ofjudges, compare Geoffrey R. Stone, JudicialActivism & Ideology, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 281 (2003)
(arguing that it is appropriate for the Senate to examine the ideology of judges), with Stephen B.
Presser, What a Real Conservative Believes about "JudicialIdeology," 6 GREEN BAG 2D 285
(2003) (arguing that it is not appropriate).
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II.

APPLYING A CONSERVATIVE CRITIQUE TO THE
GRUTTER DECISION

How, then, might one apply this conservative critique to what the
United States Supreme Court did in Grutter?3" It is very difficult to
understand the Court as doing anything other than articulating an
essentially legislative judgment. We might begin with the "compelling
interest" and "narrow tailoring" elements that the Court is ostensibly
following.32 Nowhere in the Constitution, of course, does it talk about
"compelling interests"; rather, the Court devised this concept to
accomplish the tricky task of permitting state officials to perform acts that
would otherwise be marked unconstitutional. After Grutter,no one knows
what actually is a compelling interest that permits racial discrimination. As
Justice Thomas pointed out, before Grutter, compelling interests
seemingly had something to do with national security or remedying prior
racial discrimination, 3 but neither of these is applicable to the Michigan
situation. As Professor Crump and several of the Supreme Court Justices
remarked, narrow tailoring is equally lacking in transparency. 4 If it is
supposed to mean the narrowest possible constitutional breach to achieve
worthy goals, the scheme used by the University of Michigan Law School
does not seem to fit the bill.
Like other cases in which Justice O'Connor has written or participated
in the majority or plurality opinions, the Court in Gruttersought to apply
what is essentially a balancing test. The Court recognized that racial
discrimination in any form is bad, but a little of it is permissible to
accomplish more worthy goals (such as social advancement for previously
discriminated-against races or ethnic groups). Justice O'Connor had
considerable experience as a state legislator before serving on the Supreme
Court, and it certainly appears as if her "balancing tests" are more the tools
of someone engaging in the kind of policy choices characteristic of a state
legislator than anyone seeking neutrally to apply a pre-existing rule of
law.35 Professor Crump is quite correct to call Justice O'Connor's

31. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
32. See id.at 324-26.
33. Id.at 351-52 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
34. See, e.g., Crump, supra note 1,at 494 (noting that Justice O'Connor's conclusion that the
University of Michigan School of Law's affirmative action policy was narrowly tailored was
"unpersuasive").
35. On the inappropriateness of the kinds of balancing tests that Justice O'Connor is prone
to embrace, see, for example, T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age ofBalancing,
96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987). For specific recent criticisms of Justice O'Connor's essentially legislative
approach to deciding questions of constitutional law see, for example, Charles Krauthammer,
Courting a Crisis of Legitimacy, WASH. POST, July 4, 2003, at A23 ("A foreigner might then ask:

What exactly is your Constitution? Now we know the answer. The Constitution is whatever Justice
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pronouncement that the ruling in Grutter should expire after twenty-five
years36 "eye-popping ' -although I prefer "mind-boggling"--but such a
sunset provision would not be surprising in a legislative act. It is, however,
hardly the stuff of natural law, original understanding, or adherence to
previous precedent.
Still, one should not be too hard on Justice O'Connor. If she is the
worst villain when it comes to "balancing tests" and legislative
pronouncements on our highest Court, she certainly has accomplices now
(like Justices Kennedy and Souter in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey,3" and
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens in Grutter3), and likeminded predecessors (including Justice Powell in Regents ofthe University
of Californiav. Bakke,4" and a majority of the Warren Court in decisions
such as Miranda v. Arizona,4 ' Reynolds v. Sims,42 Baker v. Carr,43 and
even Brown v. Board of Education44 ). The Supreme Court's penchant for
laying out detailed rules for state and local governments to follow that
result from balancing tests and that are hardly clearly mandated by the
Constitution is nothing new.
Moreover, the champions of "neutral principles" have never been able
to articulate a means of solving the difficult problem that some
constitutional values, such as the freedom of association purportedly
guaranteed by the First Amendment45 and the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of "equal protection, ' ' 6 are somewhat at odds. Deciding how to
prioritize them (as must inevitably be done) is not an activity for which the
Constitution itself offers much guidance. 47 A conservative might suggest

Sandra Day O'Connor says it is. On any given Monday."), and Goldberg, supra note 29. Jonah
Goldberg intoned:
As Charles Krauthammer and others have noted, Sandy Baby (as John Riggins
once dubbed her) is the Constitution of the United States of America. If she wants
the text to mean free speech for everybody, then free speech for everybody it is.
If she wants it to mean censorship for everybody, well shut my mouth!
Id.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Grutter,539 U.S. at 343.
Crump, supra note 1, at 494.
See 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992).
See Grutter,539 U.S. at 324-25.
See 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (Powell, J.).
See 384 U.S. 436, 515 (1966).
See 377 U.S. 533, 578 (1964).
See 369 U.S. 186, 258-60 (1962).
See 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954).
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
See. e.g., Wechsler, supra note 27, at 25-26 (stating that he is unable to prioritize
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that in such a situation the job of the Court is to defer to the political
branches of the government, and this seems to be the reason that Learned
Hand,48 Alexander Bickel,49 and others were critical of the Warren Court's
attempts at societal reconstruction.
Even if one conceded the propriety of some balancing on the part of the
Court, even if one were able to make sense of the basis for calling some
interests compelling and others not, and even if one were willing to sign
on to narrow tailoring and twenty-five-year sunset provisions in judicial
opinions, it would still be difficult to defend Grutter from a conservative
perspective. From a conservative perspective, one ought to be able to
demand of the Court, at a minimum, some sincerity, honesty, or
transparency (this must be the meaning of "reasoned elaboration" after
all) 0 in the interpretation of the Constitution.
Undoubtedly there have been other opinions where the dissenters attack
the basic integrity of what the majority has done, but Grutter surely now
wins the prize. Justice Rehnquist found that what the majority had
approved was "a naked effort to achieve racial balancing"" ! and rejected
the "critical mass" argument of the Michigan Law School, since there was
apparently no attempt to secure critical masses of Native Americans or
Hispanics. 2 The Law School's "alleged goal of 'critical mass,"' the Chief
Justice explained, "is simply a sham."53 Justice Kennedy was equally
forthright. Joining in Justice Rehnquist's opinion, he stated:
[Rehnquist] demonstrates beyond question why the concept
of critical mass is a delusion used by the Law School to mask
its attempt to make race an automatic factor in most instances
and to achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from quotas.
An effort to achieve racial balance among the minorities the
school seeks to attract is, by the Court's own admission,
"patently unconstitutional."
Even one of the majority Justices, Justice Ginsburg, to her credit,
writing in Gratz, appears to understand that what the Court was approving

competing constitutional values of First Amendment Freedom of Association and Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection in the context of court-mandated racial integration). But see Wright,
supra note 28, at (suggesting that such prioritization is possible and it is the Court's job to do it).
48. See HAND, supra note 26, at 73.
49. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

6-8

(Yale

Univ. Press 1978) (1970).
50. On "reasoned elaboration," see generally Wechsler, supra note 27.
51. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 379 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 379-83 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 383 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 330).
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in Grutter is a procedure conducted by "winks, nods, and disguises. 5
Justice Scalia ridiculed the Gruttermajority for advancing as a compelling
interest in a law school the teaching of the kind of "good 'citizenship"' 6
lessons that are more appropriate for the Boy Scouts or kindergarten.
Scalia essentially labeled what the majority had done as incoherent and
counterproductive because of the litigation it will encourage." From
Justice Thomas came some of the most biting observations. In particular,
Thomas wrote: "The majority upholds the Law School's racial
discrimination not by interpreting the people's Constitution, but by
responding to a faddish slogan of the cognoscenti. ' 8 Professsor Crump
also does a fine job of exposing the fact that the majority's reliance on
"diversity" as a compelling constitutional goal is fatally flawed, or at least
deeply "'fudged."'5 9
Neo-conservatives are said to endorse the purported teaching of Plato
that sometimes the telling of "noble lie[s]" or the maintenance of
manufactured state "myth[s]" is justifiable because of the limited
capacities of the masses, and the need to secure their obedience and
allegiance.6 ' The great Dostoevsky made a similar observation about most
Russians' need to find "miracle, mystery, and authority" in the Church. 6'
There has even been a recent article in a political science journal defending
Grutteras a necessary exercise in deception to achieve a greater good.62

55. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 305 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
56. Grutter,539 U.S. at 347-48 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
57. Id. at 348 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Unlike a clear
constitutional holding that racial preferences in state educational institutions are impermissible, or
even a clear anticonstitutional holding that racial preferences in state educational institutions are
OK, today's Grutter-Gratz split double header seems perversely designed to prolong the
controversy and the litigation.").
58. Id. at 350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
59. See, e.g., Crump, supra note 1,at 528 & n.336 ("Michael Kinsley, often thought of as a
liberal columnist, describes the Court's opinion as permitting a 'fudged' result. '[C]onfusion,' he
says, 'seems to be a purposeful strategy' of the Court, which he thinks is 'in denial on this point."')
(alteration in original) (quoting Michael Kinsley, Want Diversity? Think Fuzzy, WASH. POST, June
25, 2003, at A23).
60. See, e.g., Danny Postel, Noble Lies andPerpetual War: Leo Strauss,the neo-cons, and
Iraq, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Oct. 16, 2003), at http://www.opendemocracy.net/debates/article-3-771542.jsp (discussing the "neo-cons"' dependence on the thought of Leo Strauss, who is said to have
borrowed the concept of the "noble lie" from Plato).
61. FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV 307 (Andrew R. MacAndrew trans.,
Bantam Books 1970) (1880). See generally William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 843, 850 (1993) (concluding that embracing "miracle, mystery, and authority"
entails surrendering freedom, while acknowledging the complexity of Dostoevsky's portrayal of
the Grand Inquisitor).
62. Daniel Sabbagh, JudicialUses ofSubterfuge: Affirmative Action Reconsidered,118 POL.
Sci. Q. 411, 411,435-36 (2003). Sabbagh argues:
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Whatever the social scientists, novelists, or political partisans might say,
however, it is difficult for any conservative with any remaining belief in
"reasoned elaboration" or the "rule of law" (which amounts to the same
thing) to defend a constitutional jurisprudence, like that in Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Grutter, built upon a tissue of lies. Alexander
Hamilton's Federalist78 and several of the other FederalistPaperswere
devoted to suggesting that character and integrity were important in the
choice of judges and other officials. Opinions perpetrating "shams,"
"faddish slogans," or "nods and winks" would not seem to be what
Hamilton, Madison, and Jay had in mind.63
Why, then, the need for this deception? What really is sought to be
concealed? Professor Crump is clearly onto something when he advances
a goal of "nondiscrimination" rather than "diversity," and I'll have a bit
more to say about this below, but what really seems to prompt the
majority's approval of what we might label the thinly disguised quota
system in Grutteris the intractability of the gap between the standardized
test scores and grades of blacks and other minorities when compared to
those for whites and Asians.65 Perhaps Justice O'Connor's sunset provision

[S]ome of the most important developments in the Supreme Court's case law on
affirmative action and racial discrimination in general can be understood as
reflecting a tendency to approximate the hypothetical end state that would result
from the unknown implementation of affirmative action programs. Affirmative
action is a policy that requires a measure of dissimulation to succeed.
Id. at 411. Sabbagh suggests that is what the majority was up to in Grutter.Id. at 435-36.
63. For the importance of character and integrity in The FederalistPapers,and on the part
of the Framers generally see, for example, Stephen B. Presser, Would George Washington Have
Wanted Bill ClintonImpeached?, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 666 (1999) (arguing that the importance
that the Framers accorded to character and integrity would have led them, if they had the chance,
to vote to impeach former President Clinton).
64. Crump, supra note 1,at 506-13.
65. See, e.g., Sabbagh, supra note 62, at 431 ("Within a theoretically flexible affirmative
action program, the average SAT scores of black and Hispanic applicants may lag too far behind
those of white and Asian applicants for a suitable degree of diversity to obtain if one is to consider
race and ethnicity simply as 'one factor among others."') (citing THE BLACK-WITE TEST SCORE
GAP (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998) and Jeffrey Rosen, Is Affirmative Action
Doomed?, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 17, 1994); see also Lino A. Graglia, The "Affirmative Action"
Fraud,54 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 31, 31-32, 36 (1998). Graglia notes:
The whole point of all racial preference programs is to evade and camouflage the
fact that the groups preferred by the programs cannot otherwise compete with
others for admission to selective institutions of higher education on the basis of
the standard criteria for academic achievement or ability. It is necessary, therefore,
that misdirection and concealment characterize every aspect of such programs....
The virtual nonexistence of blacks at the level of academic achievement
required for admission to highly selective schools means that their admission in
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is advanced in the belief that this gap will somehow recede in the next
quarter-century, but the statistics cited by Justice Thomas do not support
such an assertion.66
The majority in Grutter seems also to be revealing its policy-making
role, and its departure from traditional constitutional analysis, by
indicating its reliance on social scientists to support its advancement of
"diversity" as a compelling state interest. 67 There is, of course, some
precedent for the reliance on the work of social psychologists in matters
of race. Brown v. Board of Education depended, for its conclusion that
"[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal," on the
conclusion of psychologists and others that separating students by race
damaged the "hearts and minds" of the black students in a manner that
made it more difficult for them to learn.68 While this conclusion was the

substantial numbers requires that the ordinary admission criteria be not merely
bent or relaxed, but virtually ignored.
Id.
66. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 375-77 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Thomas noted:
The majority does not and cannot rest its time limitation on any evidence that the
gap in credentials between black and white students is shrinking or will be gone
in that timeframe. In recent years there has been virtually no change, for example,
in the proportion of law school applicants with LSAT scores of 165 and higher
who are black.
Id. at 375-76 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
67. Id. at 330-32 ("In addition to the expert studies and reports entered into evidence at trial,
numerous studies show that student body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and 'better
prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as
professionals."') (quoting Brief for American Educational Research Association et al. as Amici
Curiae at 3, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (citing W. BOWEN & D. BOK, THE SHAPE OFTHE
RIVER (1998), DIVERSITY CHALLENGED: EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (G.
Orfield & M. Kurlaender eds., 200 1), and COMPELLING INTEREST: ExAMINING THE EVIDENCE ON
RACIAL DYNAMIcs IN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (M. Chang et al. eds., 2003))). But see id. at
2358 (Thomas, ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (providing a scathing critique of these
conclusions); infra text accompanying notes 74-82.
68. 347 U.S. 483,493-94 (1954). To support the assertion that"Whatever may have been the
extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding [of the
psychological damage that racial segregation does to black students] is amply supported by modem
authority," id. at 494, the Court cited the following authority:
K. B. Clark, Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality Development
(Midcentury White House Conference on Children and Youth, 1950); Witmer and
Kotinsky, Personality in the Making (1952), c. VI; Deutscher and Chein, The
Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey of Social Science
Opinion, 26 J.Psychol. 259 (1948); Chein, What are the Psychological Effects of
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ostensible reason for deciding Brown, a later attempt to allow racial
segregation in the schools, on the grounds that the work of other social
scientists suggested that racial homogeneity actually fostered an
atmosphere more conducive to learning, was summarily rejected.69 The
Brown Court's professed reliance on social science allowed it to make an
end run around Plessy's concept of "separate but equal" without actually
overruling that decision.7" However, one suspects the Brown Court was
really using the data of psychologists as a prop to support a decision based
not on the psychology of learning, but rather on some set of assimilationist
notions grounded in a concept of a color-blind Constitution that some
members of the Court must not have believed the nation (or at least
constitutional lawyers) was quite prepared for. That the psychological
aspects of Brown were far less important than the political or
internationalist aspects now seems to be a staple of scholarship on the
decision.7
The fact that Brown must have been about more than social psychology
roiled its critics, such as Herbert Wechsler, who wondered how damage to
"hearts and minds" of schoolchildren could explain the Court's subsequent
summary decisions that there could be no racial discrimination in public
parks, swimming pools, and golf courses.' Wechsler took the Court to
task for failing to decide according to traditional canons that required at
least some support in the reasoning of prior cases to decide subsequent
ones.73 One wonders whether Wechsler, as a good conservative, was also
concerned that the Court really had no competence to decide cases on the
grounds of social psychology in the first place.

Segregation Under Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3 Int. J. Opinion and Attitude
Res. 229 (1949); Brameld, Educational Costs, in Discrimination and National
Welfare (Maclver, ed., 1949), 44-48; Frazier, The Negro in the United States
(1949), 674-81. And see generally Myrdal, An American Dilemma (1944).
Id. at 494 n. !.
69. See Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. ofEduc., 220 F. Supp. 667,668-75,682 (S.D.
Ga. 1963) (upholding segregated schools based on extensive social science data), rev'd 333 F.2d
55, 61-62, 67 (5th Cir. 1964) (summarily dismissing the social science data presented below).
70. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896) (holding that "separate but equal" was
constitutional with regard to the provision of public transportation).
71. See, e.g., MARY L. DuDzlAK, COLD WAR CivIt RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 90-113 (2000) (arguing that Brown was designed to send a message in the
cold war era that ours was a just society); MORTON J. HoRwrrz, THE WARREN COURT AND THE
PURSUIT OF JUSTICE (1998) (describing the Warren Court's general effort to implement its
conception of democracy and justice); Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court: Rediscovering the
Link Between Law and Culture, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 450 (1988) (demonstrating how the Warren
Court used the insights of legal realism to seek to transform American law).
72. Wechsler, supra note 27, at 22.
73. Id. at 15.
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One might conclude that the GrutterCourt's support of the Michigan
Law School admissions policy could be attacked on the same grounds.
Among other things, this argument is what Justice Thomas (another good
conservative) writes in his dissent. Thomas observes that the majority in
Grutter relies on "social science evidence to justify its deference" to the
Law School's conclusion that including a "critical mass" of black students
will lead to educational benefits for all students.' Thomas then criticizes
the majority for failing to take into account other social science data that
suggest, for example, that "the racial mix of a student body produced by
racial discrimination of the type practiced by the Law School in fact
hinders students' perception of academic quality" or "the growing
evidence that racial (and other sorts) of heterogeneity actually impairs
learning among black students."75 Indeed, turning to a prior opinion of the
Court on racial matters, Thomas states: "Beyond the harm the Law
School's racial discrimination visits upon its test subjects, no social
science has disproved the notion that this discrimination 'engender[s]
attitudes of superiority or, alternatively, provoke[s] resentment among
those who believe that they have been wronged by the government's use
' Or worse, "' [t]hese programs stamp minorities
of race."76
with a badge of
inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies or to adopt an
attitude that they are "entitled" to preferences."' 77 For Thomas, the
University of Michigan Law School and the Supreme Court majority that
' concept that demanded
supported it were favoring a trendy "aesthetic"78
the proper proportion of black and minority faces in the classroom-a
concept that actually harmed those it ostensibly sought to help.
Thomas' key point was that rather than assessing the costs of the Law
School's program to all students, the majority blithely accepted the
University of Michigan's claim that counting by race has educational
benefits. Indeed, as Thomas implies, if deference to these kinds of
judgments on the part of schools was constitutionally required, then the
Court should have upheld discrimination by sex in the VMI case.79 Justice
Thomas thus highlighted the three most troubling aspects of Grutter for
conservatives (or those who care about the rule of law); the intellectual
74. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 364-66 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
75. Id. at 364 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
76. Id. at 373 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (alteration in original)
(quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,241 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment)).
77. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting AdarandConstructors,
Inc., 515 U.S. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgement)).
78. Id. at 354 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
79. Id. at 364-68 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol56/iss4/3

14

Presser: A Conservative Comment on Professor Crump

A CONSERVATIVE COMMENT ON PROFESSOR CRUMP

incoherence of the majority's refusal to ground its decision in prior
precedent; the emptiness of the compelling interest and narrow tailoring
standards; and the abandonment of the Constitution in favor of a set of
social scientists (or "aesthetes") whose questionable views are uncritically
accepted.
Thomas powerfully condemned the majority's condescending attitude
toward blacks, which manifested itself in the deference the majority gave
to the Law School and the social scientists. He began his dissent with a
quotation from Frederick Douglass indicating that the best thing for blacks
was to subject them to the same tests, requirements, and standards applied
to non-minorities.'s For Thomas and for other conservatives, the Court
should have invoked the "color-blind" approach of the great Harlan dissent
in Plessy8" and some of the Court's more recent rejections of racial setaside plans, 2 and Michigan Law School's "color-conscious" admissions
plan should have been rejected.
Still, if conservative constitutional law, as currently practiced, requires
adherence to the original understanding of constitutional provisions, one
has to at least hesitate before accepting the concept of a color-blind
Constitution applied to state educational systems. At least one scholar,
examining the founding era and the history of the Fourteenth Amendment,
has constructed a powerful originalist case for interpreting the Fourteenth
and Fifth Amendments as permitting race-conscious remedies and
affirmative action of the kind practiced by the University of Michigan.83
Indeed, one of the leading proponents of "originalism," Raoul Berger, in
criticizing the Court's interpretation in Brown and a host of other
Fourteenth Amendment decisions, has passionately argued that the
Fourteenth Amendment should be restricted to its original purposes:
protecting from state interference the freedoms guaranteed by the 1866
Civil Rights Act, specifically the right of black citizens (and others) to
enjoy the same enforcement of property and contract rights available to
white citizens." In areas of education, criminal law enforcement, and even

80. Id. at 350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Like Douglass, I
believe blacks can achieve in every avenue of American life without the meddling of university
administrators.").
81. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
82. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
83. Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal Government's Power to Enact Color-ConsciousLaws:
An OriginalistInquiry, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 477 (1998). Professor Siegel addresses the power of the
Federal Government to enact such remedial legislation, but his work has implications as well for
state law. Id. at 481.
84. Raoul Berger, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OFTHE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1997). But see Michael W. McConnell, Originalismand the Desegregation
Decisions,81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995) (criticizing Berger for slighting sources indicating that the
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to have a broader reach than just to legitimate the 1866 Civil
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voting, originalists such as Berger might argue that the states should be
free to administer whatever policies they find appropriate, and thus
accumulate a critical mass of black and other minority students in law
schools (or colleges), at least if the only objection was grounded in
Fourteenth Amendment constitutional law.
But whether the Constitution itself is color-blind, and whether the
Fourteenth Amendment had limited objectives, a conservative who sought
merely to get courts to follow statutory directives should have been
troubled by the conduct of the majority in Grutter. This dismay results
because, while the Constitution may not clearly be color-blind, for some
time now Congress has adopted a national policy that might be so
characterized. There was, for example, a famous moment in congressional
history when then Senator Hubert Humphrey promised that he would "'eat
the paper the bill was written on' if the Civil Rights legislation then
before the federal legislature (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)
could ever be construed as allowing preferential treatment by race. 5 More
to the point, there is now legislation, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,86 relied on in part by the plaintiffs who sought to overturn the
University of Michigan's admissions policies," which provides that "[n]o
person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance."8 8 There is some Supreme Court authority that
these words only forbid discrimination forbidden by the Fourteenth
Amendment,89 but they are clearer and more specific than the Fourteenth

Rights Act).
85. See PRESSER, supra note 6, at 186 (quoting JARED TAYLOR, PAVED wrrH GOOD
INTENTIONS: THE FAILURE OF RACE RELATIONS IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 126 (1992)).

86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2000d-4a (2000). The United States Supreme Court also noted in
Gratz that the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000), "was 'meant, by its broad terms,
to proscribe discrimination in the making or enforcement of contracts against, or in favor of, any
race,"' and "that a contract for educational services is a 'contract' for purposes of § 1981 ." Gratz
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244,276 n.23 (2003) (quoting McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427
U.S. 273, 295-96 (1976)).
87. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 813-14 (2000), rev 'd, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
89. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 325 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[Als applied to the case before us, Title VI goes no
further in prohibiting the use of race than the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment itself."). It should be noted that in Bakke:
THE CHIEF JUSTICE and our Brothers STEWART, REHNQUIST, and
STEVENS, have concluded that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat.
252, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d etseq., prohibits programs such as that at the
Davis Medical School. On this statutory theory alone, they would hold that
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Amendment's "equal protection" language and can clearly stand on their
own. The Fourteenth Amendment may be ambiguous as to whether it
guarantees a color-blind Constitution, but Title VI seems more clearly to
guarantee color-blind federal funding.
If the University of Michigan Law School's plan, as Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas, and Professor Crump
have demonstrated, really did amount to impermissible counting and
admitting by race (the obfuscatory pronouncements of the majority
notwithstanding), then because the University of Michigan clearly was in
receipt of federal funds, the majority, relying on the statute, should have
struck down the Law School's admission program. Whatever the original
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates, there seems to be
no constitutional objection, at least where the allocation of federal funds
is concerned, to Congress's formulating a national policy that seeks to bar
all discrimination based on race. Where it has clearly indicated a desire to
do so, even a minimal belief in conservative concepts of the rule of law
should have dictated deference to that congressional policy. As Justice
Samuel Chase put it in June 1804:
I know that in England construction has gone a great way in
construction of the words of Statutes. This doctrine I explode.
If the words of Statutes are clear, I am bound, tho' the
provision be unjust. This I hold to be the duty of an American
Judge. [A] Judge has in this Country only to say Sic lex est
scripta.
On any conservative test, whether it is transparency, avoidance of public
policy pronouncements based on social science data of a kind only a
legislature is equipped to evaluate, or even the minimal requirements of
the adherence to previous precedent or the dictates of statutes, the majority
opinion in Grutter fails. But what of Professor Crump's alternative?

respondent Allan Bakke's rights have been violated and that he must, therefore,
be admitted to the Medical School."
concurring injudgment in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
(Brennan, J.,
90. Penn's Lessees v. Pennington (Del. Cir. Ct. 1804), available at Richard S. Rodney, The
End of the Penns' Claims to Delaware, 1789-1814, 61 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 182, 196

(1937) (alteration in original). For similar adherence to the sic lex est scripta rule on the part of a
sitting Supreme Court Justice, see generally SCALIA, supra note 27.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

17

Florida Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 3

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

III.

[Vol. 56

APPLYING THE CRITIQUE TO PROFESSOR
CRUMP'S PROPOSAL

Professor Crump's article is a subtle, indeed, one is tempted to say,
nuanced, approach to the problem of what to do with race in law school
admissions, and, if ultimately I find his suggested solution unsatisfactory,
I still think he has made a laudable contribution to the discussion. As I
have previously indicated, he has done a fine job pinpointing
inconsistencies and weaknesses in the majority opinion in Grutter. In
particular, he correctly suggests that the majority appears to be approving
what is better described as "racial diversity" than as "viewpoint
diversity."'" He astutely notes John 0. McGinnis and Matthew Schwartz's
observation that if universities were really interested in viewpoint
diversity, they would be out seeking affirmative action means of hiring
more Evangelical Christians and Republicans.92 He is similarly correct to
stress the inevitable invidiousness that the Gruttermajority is condoning,
which may ultimately result in identifying who is black and who is white
by "bloodline percentages" or other distasteful means.93 He makes much
of the arbitrary behavior the Grutter majority may allow, such as that of
the Professor who hated Republicans and thus protested classifying
Cubans as Hispanics.94 As did Justice Thomas, Professor Crump rightly
notes that "[w]e should not be surprised if race-driven admissions produce
a student body that discounts the competence of minority group admittees"
and if the kind of affirmative action now allowed by the United States
Supreme Court will result in a situation that is unfair to racial minorities
who got in on their merits, or to those who did not, but who later do
succeed as well as other neutrally admitted students.95 As Justice Thomas
also stressed,
this results in harm to the very group the majority seeks to
96
protect.

91. Crump, supra note 1, at 500-01.
92. Id.
at 502 n. 159; see also Graglia, supra note 65, at 35 (noting that on law school faculties
and in other institutions we have no problem accepting disproportionate representation of some
minorities). Graglia writes:
We seem generally to have no difficulty in accepting gross racial and ethnic
disproportions in educational institutions and elsewhere. For example, Jews make
up about forty percent of many law faculties, Asians dominate Ph.D.'s in math
and science, and blacks make up two-thirds of the players in professional football
and four-fifths in basketball.
Id.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Crump, supra note I, at 503.
Id. at 504, 525-28.
Id. at 505.
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,364-74 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
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But while Thomas suggests, quoting Frederick Douglass, that all the
"'negro'" wants is to be permitted to "'stand on his own legs"' on a basis
of equality with others,97 and thus race-neutrality ought to be favored in
admissions, Professor Crump appears, ultimately, to rely on the same
counting by race that he condemns in the Grutter majority.
Instead of rejecting the whole dubious edifice of compelling interests
and narrow tailoring, Professor Crump embraces them, apparently
believing that all that is needed is a bit of fine-tuning. His tuning is finer
than that employed by the Grutter majority, such as his definition of
compelling interest "as one that transcends political philosophies, temporal
constraints, and rhetorical tricks." ' But if this is an improvement over the
Grutter majority, it is because that majority has attempted no real
definition at all. Moreover, it also seems difficult to cabin the meaning of
something "that transcends political philosophies, temporal constraints,
and rhetorical tricks." This definition has the ring of something like
"reasoned elaboration"" and would, at the least, exclude lying about what
one is doing, but it seems to permit virtually anything that has a long
history of being perceived as worthy to be labeled a compelling interest.
Anything a court might conceivably think of as consistent with our
"republican tradition," for example, might qualify. This list might include
anything from encouraging belief in a transcendent creator to the
protection of private property. Indeed, such a view of compelling interest
might well permit more freedom to the Court to disregard unconstitutional
action than it has employed in the past.
Even so, Professor Crump's compelling interest of "active
nondiscrimination '' " is a worthy one and might even be interpreted, at
first blush, to be what he calls the "conservative" move to race-neutral
remedies.' He quickly explains, however, that "active nondiscrimination"
dissenting in part).
97. Id. at 350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Frederick
Douglass, What the Black Man Wants: An Address Delivered in Boston, Massachusetts (Jan. 26,
1865), in 4 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERs 59,68 (J. Blassingame & J.McKivigan eds., 199 1).
98. Crump, supra note 1,at 512.
99. "Reasoned elaboration" is a jurisprudential style that developed in the fifties and sixties
as a means of refuting the assertions of "legal realism" that decisions by judges were essentially
legislative, if not arbitrary. The essence of it seemed to be that judges should elaborate on the
principles of prior decisions, extending them where the logic of prior decisions seemed to compel
such extension, and that while judges were not necessarily bound only by original understanding,
they should leave legislation to legislatures and administrative agencies, which were better
equipped to formulate policy. For a paradigm example of this approach, see Wechsler, supra note
27. On the development of reasoned elaboration, see generally G. Edward White, The Evolution
ofReasoned Elaboration:JurisprudentialCriticismandSocial Change, 59 VA. L. REv. 279 (1973).
100. Crump, supra note I, at 485.
101. Id. at 506 ("The 'conservative' view, to the extent that it is susceptible of definition,
rejects both affirmative action and diversity, and it insists on government neutrality toward race.").
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"differs from the putative liberal position [of encouraging racial diversity]
because it is targeted at distributive justice rather than diversity" and,
further, that "[n]ondiscrimination, here, means an active effort to
overcome the effects of prejudice. It implies a decision-making structure
that achieves distributive justice rather than ignoring it."' 2 Alas, at about
this point he loses me, and my way is not more clearly marked by his
confession that he proposes to determine whether the goal of "active
nondiscrimination" is being met "by something closely akin to the putative
liberal objective: something very much like [well], racial diversity.... The
unexplained absence of diversity is important not for its own sake, but
because it suggests that the State's policies are not truly
nondiscriminatory."' 03
As a conservative, I get nervous whenever there is talk of "distributive
justice," because "distributive justice," which I suppose means something
like giving people what they truly deserve,'0 4 has a nasty way of shifting
into efforts at redistribution,0 5 and thus violating Kirk's canon about the
linkage between "freedom and [the protection of private] property."'0 6
Moreover, if Crump's "distributive justice" is used to correct prior
discrimination (as might seem to be required by his notion of "active
nondiscrimination"), then it might require the same selective picking of
favored races and ethnic groups, and the same rejection of those
disfavored, that Professor Crump rightly condemns on the part of the
Grutter majority.
If I understand Professor Crump correctly, he is suggesting we must
ensure "active nondiscrimination" results in law school classes in which
there is minority representation that convinces us that discrimination has
not been practiced. He appears to imply that if we engage in the kind of
laudable recruiting efforts that the University of Houston's law school
conducts, where it seeks to promote applications from students at

I am not certain that the "conservative view," if one exists, does actually reject diversity. See supra
text accompanying note 15 (discussing Russell Kirk's second canon); infra text accompanying
notes 139-42.
102. Crump, supra note 1,at 506.
103. Id. at 506-07.
104. See, for example, the definition of"distributivejustice," supplied by Wikipedia, the "Free
Encyclopedia" on the Internet: "Distributive justice is the doctrine that a decision is just or right
if all parties receive what they need or deserve. It is often contrasted with procedural justice.
Distributive justice concentrates on just outcomes, while procedural justice concentrates on just
processes." WIKIPEDIA, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributivejustice (last modified Feb. 25,
2004).
105. See generally JOHN E. ROEMER, THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (1996) (providing
a recent monograph on theories of distributive justice).
106. See supra text accompanying note 15.
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historically black (and, presumably, other minority) colleges,' 7 this
process will later result in a class containing some discernable proportion
of minorities that will demonstrate to us that "nondiscrimination" is being
practiced.' 8 Unless I'm missing something, it appears Professor Crump
assumes that the qualities law schools ought to be seeking in applicants are
more or less evenly distributed among all racial and ethnic groups, so that
a school following a policy of "active nondiscrimination" that recruits
from all groups, and does not then discriminate by race or ethnic group,
will inevitably end up with racial and ethnic groups represented in a way
that can objectively be determined to be "fair" or "just," or, perhaps,
"balanced."' 9 1 think Professor Crump is bringing back "disparate impact"
analysis, with a bit of gloss." 0
Professor Crump appears to take the position that while more men than
women may seek to apply to engineering schools, this may be because (for
whatever reason) more men than women want to become engineers, and,
if so, no need for measures to promote "active nondiscrimination" would
be indicated."' In other words, in the case of engineering schools, there
may be a credible "neutral" reason for unequal representation of the sexes,
and thus there may not be invidious discrimination against women being
practiced." 2 On the other hand, says Professor Crump, "[t]he prospect of
a virtually all-male, all-white law school, hypothetically unexplainable by
any neutral phenomenon, raises the constitutional question of racial
equality."' 3 But as his own data demonstrates, law schools are no longer

107. Crump, supra note I, at 531.
108. Id.
109. See Graglia, supra note 65, at 35-36 (arguing that these qualities are not evenly
distributed).
110. On "disparate impact," see, for example, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (197 1).
In that case, the Court explained that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act:
[P]roscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form,
but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity....
. . . [Glood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem
employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as'built-in headwinds'
for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.
Id. at 431-32.
111. Crump, supra note 1, at 508 & n.199.
112. To be fair to Professor Crump, he suggests in his footnote 199 that there may be an
acceptable "neutral" reason that women are underrepresented in engineering schools, but in the text
accompanying that note he does suggest that the disparity in numbers calls for an investigation into
whether there really is a "neutral" reason that explains it. Id. at 508 & n. 199.
113. Id. at 508.
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all-male. "4 There are now years when, for some law schools at least,
applications from females outnumber those of males, and law school
classes may consist of more females than males." 5 There are also
significant numbers of Asian-Americans being admitted." 6 The "all-male,
all-white"'"17 American law school doesn't really exist anymore. Would a
law school population consisting of roughly fifty percent women and
roughly ten percent Asian-Americans, but only one or two percent blacks
or Hispanics raise a constitutional question of "racial equality" under
Professor Crump's "nondiscrimination" standard? His discussion of an
"all-male, all-white" law school seems to suggest that there is no neutral
explanation for a low number of blacks, but at least some data suggest that
a color-blind admissions policy, if applied at the top law schools, would
result in very low percentages of black and Hispanic students, since their
LSAT scores and GPAs have tended to be significantly lower than those
of White or Asian-American students."'
Apparently this result would concern Professor Crump, because he
believes that "[r]hetoric of equality without results has, at times, proved
worse than no rhetoric at all, causing racial unrest, disturbance, violence,
and riot, and resulting in death, massive losses of wealth, and major
political reactions." 19 Professor Crump thus appears to want "results," and
it is difficult to understand how this can mean anything else to him than
some kind of racial balancing. History demands something different than
"neutrality," he tells us, because there has been discrimination in the
past. 20 Professor Crump does not tell us whether, in his ideal world of
admissions, law schools should simply abandon primary reliance on LSAT
scores and GPAs when considering previously discriminated-against
minorities. The logic of his position seems to call for this conclusion, and

114. Id. at 508 & n.197.
115. See, e.g., Susan Szalewski, Women the Majority of NU Law Grads, OMAHA WORLDHERALD, May 10, 2004, News, at 2b (indicating that for the first time more women than men
received law degrees at the University of Nebraska's law school, and reporting Nebraska's Dean
Steve Wilborn's comment that "There is a national trend toward more women graduating from law
schools than men."); Pare Kelly, Working Moms Choose to Take Detours From CareerPaths,THE
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Dec. 17, 2003 ("Some law schools graduate more women than men.");
Gary Chapman, Higher Education's Gender Shift Has Social, Fiscal Ramifications, AUSTIN
AMERICAN-STATESMAN (Texas), Aug. 28, 2003, at A19 ("Nationally, women are about to
outnumber men in law schools .... ).
116. See, e.g., Graglia, supra,note 65, at 35.
117. Crump, supra note 1, at 508.
118. See Graglia, supra note 65, at 35-36.
119. Crump, supra note 1, at 512.
120. Id. at 513-16.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol56/iss4/3

22

Presser: A Conservative Comment on Professor Crump

A CONSERVATIVE COMMENT ON PROFESSOR CRUMP

he at least hints at the possibility where he delightfully suggests taking into
account competition in beauty pageants and ballroom dancing.'21
Even so, Professor Crump, at the margins at least, does seem to be
calling for different standards to be applied to previously discriminatedagainst minorities'22 in order to facilitate their admission to law school to
compensate for injustices in the past. In doing so, he runs into the same
difficulty faced by those who now argue for "reparations." Those who
would, in effect, be paying, are not those who previously discriminated."'
The University of Michigan probably would have been delighted to justify
its policy as a response to prior discrimination, because that is one of the
two compelling interests for counting by race that the Supreme Court had
previously allowed. 24 Professor Crump's grounding of his approach in the
121. Crump, supra note I, at 531-32. Professor Crump writes:
A completely different approach is to adjust non-racial admissions criteria.
For example, I have always believed that participation in competitive activities
should be treated as an important discretionary variable in admissions. This
criterion would include not only competitive sports, but also debate, competing
in the Miss Iowa pageant (as one of my more capable former students did), or,
following the example of my law school dean, competitive ballroom dancing.
Id.
122. Id. at 535. Crump suggests:
A school could admit most of its students (say, three-quarters of them), without
considering applicants' races, reserving racial consideration to the smaller portion
of qualified applicants. This proposal probably describes the results that prevail
as a matter of practice in a pure-discretion system, but explicit reservation of race
to only a portion of the class would avoid invidious treatment of the majority of
applicants and allow more focused examination of the rest.
Id.
123. See, e.g., Graglia, supra note 65, at 33.
The most common substantive argument for "affirmative action" in higher
education, as in other areas, is that it provides a "remedy" for disadvantages
resulting from past racial discrimination. The argument is obviously fallacious in
that it is not possible to remedy an injury to "A" caused by "B" by giving a benefit
to "C" at the expense of"D."
Id. (footnote omitted).
124. For the suggestion that overcoming prior discrimination by race was a permissible
"compelling interest," see, for example, Grutterv. Bollinger, 539 U.S. at 351-52 (2003) (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
A majority of the Court has validated only two circumstances where 'pressing
public necessity' or a 'compelling state interest' can possibly justify racial
discrimination by state actors. First, the lesson of Korematsu is that national
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need to remedy prior discrimination125 seems to argue for a case that is not the
Michigan one.
I have similar difficulties with Professor Crump's articulation of his version
of the narrow tailoring standard, but not with his critique of its prior application.
Professor Crump nicely skewers the narrow tailoring requirement by labeling it
the "Rodney Dangerfield" of constitutional doctrines, because it seems to get so
little respect.2 6 The lack of respect accorded to the doctrine seems appropriate,
given that it was not originally part of the compelling interestjustification,22 7 and
given that narrow tailoring seems to amount to the Court essentially asserting:
"All right, we're going to permit you to engage in clearly unconstitutional
behavior, given that we find your reason for doing so 'compelling,' but see that
you don't do too much of it." This is balancing at its worst, and the objection of
conservatives, or any one else who takes constitutional law seriously (as
Professor Crump does), is that like the compelling interest justification itself,
narrow tailoring is license for unbridled judicial discretion.
This is the essence of Professor Crump's critique of Gratzand Grutter'suse
of the narrow tailoring test. Professor Crump correctly suggests that the Supreme
Court gives us some guidance as to what narrow tailoring is not. It does not
require "absolute perfection," it does not require the sacrifice of "legitimate
objectives," and, accordingly, it ought not to interfere with the admissions
process' need for "discretion" and need for a "complex inquiry requiring the
intangible weighing of ostensibly incommensurate factors" (whatever that
means).2 8 All of this, as Professor Crump understands, is essentially obfuscatory
and, in Professor Crump's fine words, "is inadequate because it allows not only
narrow tailoring, but loose, broad, sloppy tailoring" as well. 29 The "wide-open
discretion to consider race according to the individual preferences of
administrators," which the Court's version ofnarrow tailoring permits, "is exactly
what the University ofMichigan Law School adopted."' 30 The GrutterCourt's
version of narrow tailoring, in other words, is no tailoring at all.

security constitutes a "pressing public necessity," though the government's use of
race to advance that objective must be narrowly tailored. Second, the Court has
recognized as a compelling state interest a government's effort to remedy past
discrimination for which it is responsible.
Id.
125. See Crump, supra note 1, at 506 ("Nondiscrimination, here, means an active effort to
overcome the effects of prejudice."); id. at 508 ("This Article will argue that this prospect
corresponds to a compelling governmental interest in active redress to achieve
nondiscrimination.").
126. Id. at 485.
127. Id. at 517.
128. Id. at 521.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 522.
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Just as Professor Crump sought to save the compelling interest doctrine by
providing a clear definition, he attempts to salvage the narrow tailoring standard.
Borrowing from First Amendment '"overbreadth' doctrine, he defines narrow
tailoring in the context before us as 'license to indulge in harmful uses of race
as a discriminant,"' so long as the harm caused is not 'substantial"' when
compared to either an admissions program's "plainly legitimate sweep" or "its
potential for advancing the State's compelling interest in active
nondiscrimination."'' Such a standard, he tells us, "would regard as
unconstitutional a program that permitted administrators to make invidious
decisions on racial grounds, at least if there was no need to do so to achieve the
State's legitimate objectives."'1 2 "On the other hand," he points out, his standard
"would uphold a program of affirmative action that allowed real achievement of
racial justice through distributive equality with minimal opportunities for
'
invidious discrimination."133
Some ofthis has the ring of a good idea, and there is more clarity in Professor
Crump's argument than in Gratz or Grutter' s narrow tailoringjurisprudence, but
ultimately his attempt at narrow tailoring is only marginally more satisfying than
that ofthe Court. For Professor Crump, some racial discrimination is "invidious"
and some is not, even though both may nominally be prohibited by the
Constitution. He would permit programs that have an "insubstantial" amount of
"invidious discrimination" where they further "real achievement of racial justice
through distributive equality."'' m However, besides the elusive character of his
concepts and goals, he has required the court, in every instance, to do balancing
of a kind that can only lead to untrammeled discretion on the part ofthe Court,
if not admissions departments as well. Other than some kind of suggestion that
racial discrimination for good motives (so long as there's not too much of it) is
all right while racial discrimination for bad motives (e.g., prejudice against
certain races or ethnic groups) is not, this rule offers little guidance to a court.
Professor Crump borrows from First Amendment "overbreadth" doctrine, but
what he has really called for is the same kind of uncertainty that bedevils
"interstate commerce"jurisprudence, where the Court, for so long, would allow
Congress to regulate intrastate as well as interstate commerce so long as the
former had a "substantial impact upon the latter.' Professor Crump argues that
just as Kenneth Culp Davis proposed for administrative law,I" he has arrived
131. Id. at 523.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Compare Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 1i, 114-15, 124 (1942) (finding that a farmer
growing wheat for his own consumption had a "substantial impact" on interstate commerce), with
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (finding that the federal government's interest
in criminalizing the carrying of a firearm within 1000 feet of a school was not sufficiently related
to interstate commerce).
136. Crump, supra note i, at 527.
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at a formulation that results in invidious discrimination being "structured,
confined, and checked,"' 3 7 but given the tremendous discretion even his
formulation would allow to a reviewing court, I'm not so sure.
The difficulty of formulating any kind of standard that allows
admissions officers to perform any sort of invidious discrimination by race
for noble purposes without risking the exercise of pure bigotry is so
profound that one can understand some conservatives' wishes to cut the
Gordian knot by simply forbidding all discrimination by race altogether.
According to this view, if I understand it correctly, any invidious
discrimination is too much, and all racial discrimination is invidious.
That view, the view of Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Rehnquist (and
Professor Crump's "conservative," John Leo), 38 has the virtues of being
very easy to administer and completely cutting off any discretion on the
part of the Court. It is certainly more consistent with the conservative
notions of the rule of law than is Professor Crump's. It does not require the
kind of balancing that really amounts to legislating on the part of the
Court. It is tempting, then, to suggest that conservatives, as did Mr. Leo,
should simply sign on to this color-blind Constitution view.
But, as suggested earlier, conservatives are cautious about abstract
formulations,3 and even the notion of a color-blind Constitution might
tend to fall into that category. Kirk's canons emphasize what we might
regard as the "diversity" of humankind, 40 they suggest the rejection of a
"stifling uniformity,"'' and, with regard to the matter before us, they
might even be read to champion a certain amount of creativity and
discretion on the part of admissions officers seeking to build a student
body rich in human variety. Thus, while I have some trouble with what I
believe to be Professor Crump's futile exercise in the resurrection of the
compelling interest and narrow tailoring doctrines, I have some sympathy
for his richer formulation of what he thinks admissions officers actually
ought to be permitted to do. I believe he is on to something when he
suggests that the Michigan Law School (or any other school interested in

137. Id. at 528.
138. Leo, supra note 5, at 7. Leo writes:
The Constitution and the 1964 Civil Rights Act say quite clearly that no one can
be penalized or advantaged on the basis of race. Opinion polls say the same thing.
For many years those polls, including separate surveys of minorities, have shown
consistent and lopsided opposition to racial preferences. No matter. The elites
want them, so the court stood up and delivered.
Id. Leo's
139.
140.
141.

article is cited by Professor Crump
See supra text accompanying note
See supra text accompanying note
See supra text accompanying note
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recruiting a truly diverse student body) ought to be permitted to engage in
"aggressive outreach" by partnering with historically black colleges,
opening admissions to students in the top percentages of those colleges, or,
to facilitate "a different racial impact," by adjusting its overall admissions
criteria (presumably LSAT scores and GPAs and the weighting of the
two), or to pursue a variety of other strategies, as Rice University has.'42
I would be more wary than Professor Crump of actually allowing
admissions departments to make a small percentage of choices based
exclusively on race, as he argues should still be possible, 143 since that
would get us smack into the prohibited territory of racial quotas. He makes
a provocative analogy to chemotherapy, remarking that both "[riaceconscious remedies" and chemotherapy are "drastic treatments, although
both are necessary in some limited circumstances;... care should be taken
that they are not over-used.' 44 Often the cure is worse than the disease,
and whether or not chemotherapy saves lives, I do not share Professor
Crump's confidence that it is possible to structure, confine, and check
racial discrimination when practiced by admissions departments, given the
difficulty of understanding what is actually being done, and given the
demands for close supervision and balancing that this places on the courts.
Indeed, perhaps the Grutter Court's substantial deference to admissions
officers (which Professor Crump rightly excoriates) 145 is a sign that a
majority of the Supreme Court believes the federal courts should not be in
the business of continually looking over the shoulders of admissions
officers to make sure they are not unduly counting by race. Undoubtedly,
a majority of the Court also believes that it should really not be permitting
any counting by race at all, and thus the "eye-popping," as Professor
Crump calls it, 46 suggestion that it will only be permissible for twenty-five
years, after which time it should no longer be needed (and presumably a
future Supreme Court will bar it).
IV. CONCLUSION

Professor Crump is surely correct that in Grutterand Gratzthe United
States Supreme Court applied the compelling interest and narrow tailoring
tests in a manner that makes it difficult to understand them and ultimately
permits invidious discrimination. The Grutterdecision seems to authorize
142. Crump, supra note 1, at 533-34.
143. See id. at 534-36.
144. Id. at 537.
145. See id.
at 491-94.
146. An unintended beneficiary of the Grutter and Gratz decisions might be Professor
Crump's ophthalmologist. The Professor's eyes were popped not only by the twenty-five-year
sunset provision from Grutter, id. at 494, but also by the size of the racial preference credit
accorded by the undergraduate school at the University of Michigan, id.
at 535.
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counting by race in ways that current constitutional doctrine seems to
condemn as the unacceptable use of quotas and as violations of a colorblind Constitution. Professor Crump has formulated some more precise
definitions of both compelling interest and narrow tailoring, but the
application of his tests, even if they might result in less discretion for
admissions officers, creates the need for dubious balancing tests by federal
courts and invites nearly as. much litigation as will be encouraged by the
Grutterand Gratz standards themselves. Still, many of Professor Crump's
concrete suggestions for what admissions officers seeking a rich and
ethnically diverse student body ought to do (borrowing from the
experience of the University of Houston and Rice University) have merit,
even if some go too far toward the kind of invidious discrimination against
which he argues.
Forbidding all discrimination by admissions officers in state
universities on the basis of race, a prohibition advocated by some
conservatives and by several of the dissenters in Grutter, has the merit of
checking invidious racial discrimination on the part of state officials (the
ostensible goal of the Fourteenth Amendment) and the merit of getting the
courts out of the business of supervising university admissions
departments. Professor Crump rejects such an approach because he is
sensitive to the fact that there is still a problem in American society with
race and, in particular, with the results of past discrimination in America.
There are debates about to what extent this is a problem that needs
attention, 47 and it is undeniable that when one seeks to remedy the results
of past discrimination one inevitably causes costs not only for those who
did not contribute to or benefit from that past discrimination, but also, as
Justice Thomas points out, to those whom one ostensibly seeks to help.
There is a further dilemma because there are at least two competing
policy reasons for favoring counting by race to ensure that a substantial
number of blacks, Hispanics, and other minorities are represented in law
school and other college and university classes. One is to assure their
assimilation into the broader society, which was the goal of the Civil
Rights movements in the 1950s and 1960s, and which goal seems
exemplified by such decisions as Brown v. Board of Education.148 A
second reason, however, possibly inconsistent with the first, is to furnish
minority communities with the enlightened leadership that professional
and university education can provide. Pursuant to this second goal,
members of minority groups are expected to return to their communities
and not necessarily be assimilated into a greater whole. We rarely
recognize these competing possible policies, and I am not at all sure that
147. See, e.g., Graglia, supra note 65, at 33-34 (arguing that some minority groups are now
overrepresented).
148. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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they ought to lead in the same direction with regard to college and
professional school admissions. These policies, and others, may very well
need to be weighed in a balance with policies such as the promotion of a
color-blind Constitution. As a conservative, I am not comfortable with the
federal courts doing that particular balancing act, since I believe the
original understanding of the constitutional structural scheme was that this
is a task allocated to our legislatures, and particularly our state and local
bodies.
It must be admitted that so apparently radical a step (shifting these
decisions back to states and localities) is not likely to happen in the near
future. Still, I do believe that the sensible conservative position requires
the jettisoning, in constitutional doctrine, of both compelling interest and
narrow tailoring, as those concepts are now employed, because they are
ultimately unsatisfactory means of performing policy-making and
legislative balancing of a kind forbidden to the federal courts. I would
interpret the Fourteenth Amendment, as it was originally understood, as
not giving the federal courts license to supervise state and local school
systems. I would seek the achievement of Professor Crump's goal of
"racial justice through distributive equality"' 49 not by tinkering with
abstruse and incomprehensible strict scrutiny doctrines, but by trusting the
pluralistic political process that now exists in the states and was
contemplated by our system of federalism and dual sovereignty.' 50 Racial
justice, if not distributive equality, is now a widely accepted goal at
federal, state, and local levels. Since, however, there is no agreement on
the manner of its achievement by distributive equality or by other means,
I would prefer to rely on Brandeis's fifty social laboratories,"' rather than
the federal courts or even constitutional scholars to ameliorate the
problem.

149. Crump, supra note 1, at 523.
150. For a similar favoring of that pluralistic political process by a Conservative, see BiCKEL ,
supra note 49. But see Wright, supra note 28 (condemning Bickel's reliance on such a political
process).
151. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)
(discussing states as laboratories for social and economic experiments).
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